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In previous quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, information is encoded on either the
discrete-variable of single-photon signal or continuous-variables of multi-photon signal. Here, we
propose a new QKD protocol by encoding information on continuous-variables of a single photon.
In this protocol, Alice randomly encodes her information on either the central frequency of a narrow-
band single photon pulse or the time-delay of a broadband single photon pulse, while Bob randomly
chooses to do either frequency measurement or time measurement. The security of this protocol
rests on the energy-time uncertainty relation, which prevents Eve from simultaneously determining
both frequency and time information with arbitrarily high resolution. In practice, this scheme may
be more robust against various channel noises, such as polarization and phase fluctuations.
PACS numbers:
Unlike conventional cryptography, quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) provides unconditional security guar-
anteed by the fundamental laws of quantum physics
[1, 2, 3, 4]. To date, both discrete-variable, single-photon
QKD protocols (such as the well-known BB84 protocol
[1])and continuous-variable, multi-photon QKD proto-
cols (such as QKD with squeezed states[5]) have been
developed. In the standard BB84 protocol [1, 6], one of
the legitimate users, Alice, encodes information in a two-
dimensional subspace (such as the polarization state) of
a single photon. The security is based on the no-cloning
theorem [7]. In contrast, in a continuous variable QKD
(CV-QKD), information is encoded on field quadratures
of either squeezed states or coherent states[5, 8](We name
this scheme as quadrature-coding CV-QKD to distin-
guish it from the new protocol we will present). Quantum
mechanically, the complex field amplitudes correspond to
a pair of non-commuting operatorsX1 andX2. The secu-
rity of this protocol follows from the uncertainty relation
for these two operators [5]
∆X1∆X2 ≥ 1/4, (1)
It is thus impossible to measure both of them arbitrarily
accurately.
However, there are a few practical difficulties in tele-
com fiber-based QKD. In both the phase-coding BB84
QKD system and the quadrature-coding CV-QKD sys-
tem, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is closely related
to the interference visibility, which suffers from polariza-
tion and phase instabilities induced by the optical fiber.
A Bidirectional auto-compensating structure has been in-
troduced to improve the performance of a practical QKD
system[9]. Unfortunately, this design also opens a po-
tential back-door for the eavesdropper (Eve) to launch
various Trojan horse attacks [10].
Normally, the frequency of a weak laser pulse won’t
change as it propagates through fiber, and the tem-
poral broadening can be well controlled by employing
dispersion-compensation techniques. This inspires us to
explore a frequency/time coding QKD protocol.
We remark that QKD protocols based on frequency-
coding have been studied previously[11, 12, 13]. In pre-
vious work[12]: Alice represents bit 0 and bit 1 with two
distinguishable signal states S0 (a single photon state
with frequency ω0) and S1 (frequency ω1). She randomly
prepares either one of the two signal states or a control
state Sc, which is a superposition of S0 and S1. At Bob’s
side, he randomly chooses to do one of the following three
measurements: S0 measurement with a narrowband fil-
ter centered at frequency ω0 and a single photon detector
(SPD), S1 measurement with a ω1 filter and a SPD, or
time measurement with a time-resolving SPD (no filter).
Alice and Bob uses signal states for key distribution and
control state for detecting Eve’s attack. Note in the cases
when Alice prepares the control states and Bob does the
time measurements, a high visibility interference pattern
is expected. Any attack from Eve will unavoidably blur
the interference pattern and be caught.
We remark that in the above protocol[12], the den-
sity matrix for the control state ρˆc is different from
that for the signal states ρˆs [14]. In principle, Eve
can unambiguously distinguish them with a non-zero
probability[15]. We remark that to eliminate this infor-
mation, Alice can randomly prepare two types of con-
trol states, (|ω0〉 + exp[i(ω1 − ω0)t]|ω1〉) and (|ω0〉 −
exp[i(ω1−ω0)t]|ω1〉),with equal probability. In this case,
ρˆs = ρˆc = |ω0〉〈ω0|+ |ω1〉〈ω1|.
In this letter, we propose a single photon CV-QKD
protocol: Alice randomly encodes her information on ei-
ther the central frequency or the time-delay of a trans-
form limited (TL) single photon pulse[16], while Bob ran-
domly does frequency or time measurement. The security
of this protocol can be understood from the well-known
energy-time uncertainty relation ∆E∆t ≥ ~/4. For a TL
Gaussian pulse, it’s easy to show that [17]
σωσt = 1, (2)
where σω and σt are the half width (1/e) of the intensity
spectrum and the temporal profile respectively. Eq.(2)
indicates that it’s impossible to acquire both the fre-
2FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the proposed QKD system:
S1-narrowband frequency tunable single photon source; S2-
broadband single photon source with tunable time-delay; BS-
beam splitter; DG-dispersive grating; TSPD-time-resolving
single photon detector; SPDA-single photon detector array.
quency and the time information of a single photon pulse
with an arbitrarily high resolution.
Compareing (1) with (2), we can see a high similar-
ity between our protocol and the squeezed states CV-
QKD. We remark that the energy-time uncertainty re-
lation may be different fundamentally from others, such
as the position-momentum uncertainty relation, because
time is not an observable in non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics. However, this fundamental question is outside
the scope of our current paper.
Fig.1 shows a diagram of our proposed QKD sys-
tem. In Fig.1, Alice randomly fires one of two sin-
gle photon sources: S1 produces narrowband frequency
tunable TL Gaussian pulses (bandwidth σω1), while
S2 produces broadband time-delay tunable TL Gaus-
sian pulses(bandwidth σω2, central frequency ω0), with
σω1 << σω2. The frequency tunable range of S1 matches
the spectrum of S2, while the time-delay tunable range
of S2 matches with the temporal profile of S1, as shown
in Fig.2. A beam splitter BS is employed to combine the
outputs from S1 and S2 together. At Bob’s side, passively
determined by a beam splitter, he can either conduct
time measurement with a high-speed time-resolving sin-
gle photon detector (TSPD), or frequency measurement
with a dispersive element (such as a dispersive grating)
followed by a single photon detector array (SPDA).
Our QKD protocol runs as follows:
1.Alice generates a binary random number a. If a = 0,
she generates another random number b from the Gaus-
sian distribution f1(b) = (piσ
2
ω2)
−1/2exp[−(b−ω0)2/σ2ω2];
then she sets the central frequency of S1 to b and fires
it. If a = 1, Alice generates a random number b from the
Gaussian distribution f2(b) = (pi)
−1/2σω1exp[−σ2ω1b2];
then she sets the time-delay of S2 to b and fires it.
2.Passively determined by a beam splitter, Bob ei-
ther conducts time measurement with a high-speed time-
resolving single photon detector (TSPD), or frequency
measurement with a dispersive grating (DG) followed by
a single photon detector array (SPDA).
3.They repeat step 1 and step 2 many times.
4.Through an authenticated classical communication
FIG. 2: Illustration of the frequency (time) domain distri-
butions of Alice’s single photon sources: top left-S1 in fre-
quency domain (note the envelope matches with the spec-
trum of S2); top right-S1 in time domain; bottom left-S2 in
frequency domain; bottom right-S2 in time domain(note the
envelope matches with the temporal profile of S1).
channel, they post-select the cases when the quantum
states prepared by Alice match with the measurements
conducted by Bob. After this step, Alice and Bob share
a set of correlated Gaussian variables, which are called
”key elements”.
5.Alice and Bob can use the ”sliced reconciliation” pro-
tocol [18] to transform the ”key elements” into errorless
bit strings.
6.Alice and Bob can estimate the maximum informa-
tion acquired by Eve from the measured error rate and
may use standard privacy amplification protocol to distill
out the final secure key.
The security of this protocol is based on: first, Eve
can not distinguish frequency-coding photons from time-
coding photons; secondly, Eve’s ability to simultaneously
determine both the frequency information and the time
information is constrained by the uncertainty relation
(2). It can be shown that in the asymptotic case when
σω1 → 0, the density matrixes of frequency-coding pho-
tons and time-coding photons are identical[19]:
ρˆ1 = ρˆ2 =
∫
(piσ2ω2)
−1/2exp[−(ω1 − ω0)2/σ2ω2]
×aˆ+(ω1)|0〉〈0|aˆ(ω1)dω1,
(3)
Here, aˆ+(ω) is the continuous-mode creation operator. In
practice, as long as σω1 << σω2, the difference between
the two density matrixes is negligible.
To demonstrate the feasibility of this protocol, let’s dis-
cuss the basic requirements to the system’s parameters.
At Alice’s side, the spectral width of S1 is σω1 with a con-
tinuous tunable range of σω2, and the pulse width of S2 is
σt2 = 1/σω2 with a continuous time-delay tunable range
of σt1 = 1/σω1. At Bob’s side, the spectral and time res-
olutions of his measurement device are δω and δt respec-
3FIG. 3: (a) Slice method without ”buffer zone” (for time-
coding signal) (b) Slice method with ”buffer zone” between
neighbored bins (for time-coding signal)
tively. Further more, Alice and Bob agree to slice each
”key element” into bins of size ∆t for a time-coding sig-
nal or ∆ω for a frequency-coding signal. Here, we assume
that σω2 ≫ ∆ω ≫ δω ≫ σω1 and σt1 ≫ ∆t ≫ δt ≫ σt2
as shown in Fig.3a (for the case of time-coding).
The error probability of time-coding signals can be
estimated as follows: Alice sends out photons at time
tc ∈ [−∆t/2,∆t/2], with a uniform distribution (for a
specific time bin). The intensity distribution in time do-
main measured by Bob is
I(t) = (piδ2t )
−1/2exp[−(t− tc)2/δ2t ], (4)
The probability that Bob’s measurement results lies in
the interval [−∆t/2,∆t/2] is
P∆t = (1/∆t)
∫ ∆t/2
−∆t/2
∫ ∆t/2
−∆t/2
I(t)dtdtc, (5)
The error probability Pe = (1 − P∆t) can be derived
as
Pe = 1− (1/
√
piSt)[−1+
√
piSterf(St)+ exp(−S2t )], (6)
Here, St = ∆t/δt, and erf(x) is the error function which
is given by
erf(x) = 1/
√
pi
∫ x
0
exp(−t2)dt, (7)
In the case of frequency-coding, we can define Sω =
∆ω/δω and derive a similar formula.
From (6), to get a low error rate, St (Sω)has to be
large enough. This can be achieved by either increasing
the ”bin size” ∆t(∆ω) or improving Bob’s measurement
resolution δt(δω). On the other hand, to guaranty the
security of this protocol, the bin sizes have to satisfy
the condition of ∆ω∆t < 1. These conditions set basic
requirements for Bob’s measurement resolutions δt and
δω[20]. For example, from (6), the error probability Pe
is about 0.056 at St = 10 for time-coding or Sω = 10 for
frequency-coding. The requirement for Bob’s apparatus
will be δtδω < 0.01.
We remark that Alice/Bob can improve the slice
method by adding in a ”buffer zone” between neigh-
boring bins, as shown in Fig.3b (for the case of time-
encoding). In this scenario, Alice and Bob slices their
Gaussian variables into discrete bins with a ”buffer zone”
between neighbored ones. During the classical communi-
cation stage, Alice announces which pulses are prepared
in the buffer zone, and they just drop these results. In
the case when Alice encodes her information in the ”bin
zone”, there are three possible outputs from Bob’s mea-
surement: Bob detects a signal in the same bin with
probability Pr; Bob detects a signal in ”buffer Zones”
with probability Pb (this is an inconclusive result and
they just drop it); or Bob detects a signal in other bins
with probability Pw = 1−Pr−Pb. Define ∆t as the total
size of one bin plus one buffer zone, and assume that the
bin size is equal to buffer zone size, then Pr, Pb can be
derived as
Pr = (∆t/2)
−1
∫ ∆t/4
−∆t/4
∫ ∆t/4
−∆t/4
I(t)dtdtc, (8)
Pb = (∆t/2)
−1
∫ ∆t/4
−∆t/4
∫ 3∆t/4
−3∆t/4
I(t)dtdtc − Pr, (9)
The error probability is defined as
Pe = Pw/(Pr + Pw), (10)
For St = 3, the error probability Pe calculated from
(10) is about 0.0038 while the probability of getting an
inconclusive results is about 0.36. Compared with the
slice method without a ”buffer-zone”, the error proba-
bility drops by about one order, while the efficiency also
drops by a factor of 0.5×0.64 = 0.32( the 0.5 factor is be-
cause that half of the time Alice sends out signals in the
buffer zone, and the 0.64 factor is due to the inconclusive
probability in Bob’s measurement). The requirement for
Bob’s apparatus is δtδω < 0.1, which can be satisfied with
today’s technology[21]. In practice, the buffer size could
be optimized to achieve the maximum secure key rate.
The QKD protocol proposed here has several ad-
vantages: First of all, a QKD system based on freq-
nency/time coding is intrinsically insensitive to the po-
larization and phase fluctuations. This could improve
the stability of a fiber-based one-way QKD system dra-
matically. Secondly, unlike the squeezed states QKD,
our protocol can be implemented with commercial laser
sources. TL laser pulses with different bandwidths can be
easily prepared with commercial products and they can
go through long fibers with negligible distortions (For ex-
ample, in [22], after going through a 50km fiber, a 460fs
pulse was slightly broaden to 470fs. This is orders lower
4than the time resolution of today’s SPD).Thirdly, com-
pared with previous frequency-coding protocol[12], our
system could achieve a higher key rate by using a large
alphabet.
We remark that instead of using single photon sources
(reliable perfect single photon sources are far from prac-
tical), highly attenuated laser sources could be employed
to implement our protocol. In this case, to guard against
the PNS (photon number splitting) attack, the newly de-
veloped decoy state idea can be adopted[23].
In conclusion, we propose a new QKD protocol by
encoding information on continuous-variables of single
photon signals. The security of this protocol rests on
the energy-time uncertainty relation, which prevents Eve
from simultaneously determine both frequency and time
information with arbitrarily high resolution. It will be
interesting to see whether a QKD protocol based on the
energy-time uncertainty relation is equivalent to the one
based on uncertainty relation for two non-commuting op-
erators (such as the squeezed states QKD). In practice,
this scheme may be more robust against various channel
noises, such as polarization and phase fluctuations.
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